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SUBROGATION UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-
TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE
DONALD CAMPBELL*
W ORKMEN'S compensation legislation in the United
States is little more than thirty years of age.' Although
conceived in Europe at an earlier date, and operating with
success abroad, its significance was not recognized here, and
American employers continued to follow principles inherited
from laws abandoned at their source. Employers were en-
trenched, and labor bodies were divided in their opinions as
to the most effective means of bettering the situation created
by industrial accidents, which crippled the family bread
winner, entailing financial, social, and moral losses. Pro-
posed remedial laws were thought of as labor legislation
rather than social measures.2 The beneficiary of the enact-
ments was to be the employee whose misfortunes, suffered
because of industrial accidents, should be charged directly to
his employer.
The employer, primarily liable for the payment of com-
pensation, has received less attention from the legislatures
than has been accorded to the employee, whose welfare was
the main concern. There is no doubt but that the prime object
rather successfully attained by the enactments is the speedy
and certain, although limited, compensation of those injured
in industrial accidents, with immediate benefit to their de-
pendents. The risk of accident with coincident money costs
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1 An act, limited in application, was passed by Congress and in effect in 1908.
Wisconsin passed the first compensation act May 3, 1911.
2 Beckner, A History of Illinois Labor Legislation, Ch. XV. University of Chicago
Social Science Studies (1929). Illinois typifies the history of labor legislation and
compensation acts throughout the states.
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has been shifted to the master who in turn will shift these ex-
penses to the consumer of his products as part of the cost of
production. This is theory, although it may well be urged on
the part of the employee that the difference between his
wages and the limited compensation he is paid when injured
is his contribution unabsorbed by master or consumer.
The underwriter has been active in assuming the mas-
ter's burden for a consideration which in the end must not
only be greater than the apprehended cost but must reim-
burse the insurer for his expense of administration incurred
in establishing and limiting the compensation payable. In
this process, he acquires equities which must be considered
in the final settlement.
Compensation acts were primarily concerned with the
relation between employer and employee and the legal rights
and liabilities flowing therefrom. These two persons joined
in fact and in law were bound to come into accidental collision
with other groups in similar relations as well as with still
other employers and employees and individuals who were
not bound by the acts. Impingement was to be expected; nor
could a statute be written that would anticipate, encompass,
or control all the legal effects of such contacts. To this
already fairly complex group came the insurer to whom
many statutes make no reference whatever as a subrogee2
Entire justice to the employee, the employer, and the
insurer seems Utopian. Not all situations produce a wrong-
doing scapegoat from whom all may secure indemnity in his
proper turn. In many instances a legal right may arise be-
cause of contract that produces conventional subrogation. In
many instances, equitable circumstances will indicate that
subrogation is proper without formal agreement. 4 The word-
ing of the statute may create substantive rights, or prevent
enforcement of rights.' The matter of procedure may make
8 Nineteen states (as of January, 1940) made no mention of the insurer as sub-
rogee in the compensation act. However, this does not mean necessarily that the
courts of the states making no specific mention of subrogation to carriers will not
permit an indemnity action.
4 Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Great Lakes Engineering Co., 184 F. 426, 36 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 60 (1911); Foster & Glassell Co. v. Knight Bros., 152 La. 596, 93 So. 913
(1922).
5 The obvious purpose of all compensation acts is to give a statutory right in
substitution, or in addition to a common law right, or to create a cause of action
where, under the circumstances, no right would arise. For an early discussion and
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enforcement of rights impossible or impracticable.8 In many
instances the goat will escape. How definitive or applicable
the statute was intended to be will be discovered only after
many cases have passed through the reviewing courts and
possibly to the courts of last resort.
It is toward the rationale of subrogation as applied to
workmen's compensation, and a consideration of the causes
which have prevented its application, as well as to alterna-
tive suggestions and the tendency toward further statutory
delineation that this paper is directed. It is appreciated that
the main, perhaps the sole, purpose of the legislatures in
enacting compensation acts was the advancement of the wel-
fare of the industrial workers, but even in the absence of
specific direction in the acts, the equitable principle of sub-
rogation is bound to appear as a justifiable matter of consid-
eration to a rational mind.
In view of the diversity of results reached by the courts
in cases where the operative facts are identical or very simi-
lar, it must be conceded that provision for subrogation in the
compensation statutes has not functioned with anything like
perfection, certainty, or uniformity. With the exceptions of
New Hampshire, Ohio, and West Virginia 7 all state compen-
decision of the constitutional aspects and the social implications, see New York
Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667 (1917).
6 In New York, a workman under the compensation act was killed by falling into
a furnace because of the breaking of an arch defectively installed by a third party.
His employer, through its insurance company, paid the compensation and sought
indemnity from the third party. The deceased employee had several children, of
whom two were over eighteen years of age, and therefore did not share in the
compensation awarded. The New York Death Act allowed suit only by the personal
representative for the benefit of all of the next of kin. The court held the insurance
company could not split the cause of action for its own benefit; the carrier was
subrogated only to the rights of the employee who had none under the circum-
stances and the statute. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. American Incinerator, Inc.,
et al., 51 F. (2d) 739 (D.C.S.D. New York, 1931). To work out the equities in this
case seems an insuperable task because of both substantive and adjective law.
On substantially similar facts, the Supreme Court of Washington found splitting
the widow's cause of action no obstacle to a suit by the state fund for indemnity.
State v. Vinther, 183 Wash. 350, 48 P. (2d) 915 (1935), adhered to in 186 Wash. 691,
58 P. (2d) 357 (1935).
7 Prior to 1939 Wyoming was singularly different from all other states, in that
its statute provided that where there was a legal liability in some person other
than the employer, the employee was left to his remedy at law against such other
person, and the employer was not liable for compensation. By an amendment of
February 23, 1939, the employee may now take compensation and also sue the
third person, but in case of recovery, he must reimburse the state accident fund.
Arkansas has framed an act to be submitted to the people of the state on refer-
endum this year. Mississippi has no compensation act.
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sation acts contain some provision for recoupment or re-
covery in the nature of indemnity by the paying party against
the one whose negligence or fault has produced the com-
pensible accident if there be such a one. Yet an examination
of the cases leads to the belief that statutory authority to
accomplish this obviously just result has often been too specif-
ic, and consequently too limited. Under cover of technical
obstacles of both substance and procedure the wrongdoer has
often escaped, or the real indemnitor has gone without in-
demnity.8 Is it possible omission from the acts of any pro-
vision for subrogation, or perhaps inclusion of a provision
for subrogation only in most general and comprehensive
terms, might have produced more uniform results? Com-
parisons were possible with other fields in which the equit-
able principles of subrogation were already recognized and
operating.
Without further inquiry into the considerations which
must have weighed differently with the legislatures creating
the acts, and without characterizing at this time the consider-
ations that must have been of influence with the judges in
the application of a new law to the complex facts presented
to them, one will hardly need deny that there are hundreds of
highly contradictory decisions incapable of being explained
solely on the basis of dissimilarity of statutory provisions.
Perhaps the right of subrogees are of such minor con-
sequence that until other more important provisions of the
acts are worked out with clarity, fixety, and more or less uni-
formly anticipated results, the former may be relegated to
secondary interest. The Supreme Court of Illinois has stated
that indemnity for the employer where the employee was in-
jured by a third person was in the mind of the legislature
secondarily under Section 29. 9 A few of the stock situations
8 In the case of New York, S. & W. R. Co. v. Iuebschmann et al., 111 N.J. Eq.
547, 162 A. 767 (1932), as in many cases similarly decided, the court said that
subrogation under workmen's compensation was purely statutory, and, as the
statutes specifically provided for subrogation to the employer, there should be none
for any one else. An amendment to the New Jersey act in 1931 let in the insurance
carrier, but the new law is still unsatisfactory in that it permits the action or
inaction of the employee to determine the rights of the insurer. See 4 Mercer
Beasley Law Review 98, and the comment on Scheno Trucking Co., Inc. v. Bickford
et al., 115 N.J. Eq. 380, 170 A. 881 (1934), where the amended law was applied.
9 Baker & Conrad v. Chicago Heights Construction Co., 364 Ill. 388, at 393,
4 N.E. (2d) 953 (1936). And in Walters v. Eagle Indemnity Co., 166 Tenn. 383,
61 S.W. (2d) 666 (1933), it was held that the compensation act subrogating the
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most frequently arising are here set out, although the recital
may be superfluous as to those who are familiar with the
field.
An employee driving a truck for his employer, both of
whom were "under the act," is injured by an automobile
negligently operated by a third person. Under compensation
acts, the employer will be liable for compensation to his in-
jured employee regardless of fault. The employee may ac-
cept compensation. In this case his employer (or insurance
carrier) will have a right of subrogation against the negligent
third party and should recover indemnity in a law suit against
the wrongdoer. The employee may decide that he has a good
common-law cause of action against the negligent party and
that he will be able to recover damages greater in amount
than compensation. In this instance, he may not only accept
compensation from his employer but also sue the third party.
In case of recovery of damages he should reimburse his em-
ployer for the compensation he first accepted. But the com-
pensation act may be worded so that the employee must
choose which course to pursue, and a choice of one remedy
may exclude the other. Or the compensation act may leave
the employee no choice but compensation if the wrongdoer
was also "operating under the act." And if the wrongdoer
was a "fellow servant" in the employ of the same master,
public policy announced in the act or stated by the court may
prevent a common-law suit against the fellow servant, or the
employee may sue the fellow servant at law, and the court,
because of public policy, will declare that the employer may
not be subrogated nor have indemnity from any amount re-
covered. The compensation act may provide that joint action
should be brought against the third party; so both employer
and employee may be assured of court protection of their in-
terests-the employer in that he may recover what he has
paid or may be called upon to pay as compensation, and the
employee in that he may recover at least compensation, or
perhaps a greater sum generally expressed as compensatory
damages as distinguished from the limited amount of statu-
atory compensation.
employer to the right of action of the employee where compensation has been
awarded, was enacted for the employer as an integral part of the scheme of
compensation.
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It will be readily observed that the rights of the parties
concerned will be to a considerable degree determined by
the statutes rather than upon quasi-contractual or equitable
principles, as the statutes may measure out the rights, and
prescribe methods of procedure. The rights should be fairly
certain, and the principles should apply whether the injury
to the employee is temporary or results in his death.
Subrogation is readily defined, but in its application to
particular classes of cases it may require some variation in
the language employed. "The doctrine of subrogation is a
pure unmixed equity, having its foundations in the principles
of natural justice."1 One who pays, otherwise than a volun-
teer, a debt for which another is primarily liable, is given by
equity the protection of any lien or other security for the pay-
ment of the debt to the creditor, and may enforce such
security against the principal debtor. 1
It does not appear that difficulty should be encountered
in applying the doctrine of subrogation to any situation that
might arise under the compensation acts. More appropriate
occasions than the typical compensation cases would be hard
to find.'2 The analogy to debtor-creditor-surety cases seems
10 J. Miller in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Middleport, 124 U.S. 534, 8 S. Ct. 625,
31 L. Ed. 537 (1887).
11 McClintock, Equity, § 119, p. 211.
12 Inasmuch as the early cases of subrogation dealt with the surety, the credi-
tor, and the principal debtor, and the securities safeguarding payment of the
debt, the definition given seems quite clear and concise. Historically bridging,
from the early cases where the doctrine of subrogation was originally announced,
down to the cases involving compensation, it may be noted that after the concept
was sufficiently imbedded in the law, the insurers of fire and marine risks found
subrogation most useful in recouping losses paid, where the loss was caused by
the wrongful act of a third person. At a still later date inland carriers were called
upon to answer to insurers who had paid losses to shippers and had become
thereby subrogated to claims against the carriers. At a much later date, but soon
after the inception of the compensation acts and payments made thereunder, the
courts were called upon to enforce rights of action acquired through subrogation
by the employers who had paid the required compensation to employees injured
through the fault of some third person. This situation was not unknown before
the compensation acts, for suits seeking indemnity had already been filed by
masters against those who had injured their servants and thereby occasioned
loss to the masters. Of course, no security or lien is here involved as in the
original debtor-creditor cases, but the concept of subrogation is sufficiently fluid
and expansive to carry the application, to the shipper-carrier cases. To the widen-
ing stream of subrogation is now added the insurer who bears the risks of the
employing masters. The doctrine should be "broad enough to include every
instance in which one party (other than as a volunteer) pays an obligation for
which another is primarily liable, and which in equity and good conscience should
have been paid by the latter." Quotation from Sheldon's Subrogation (2d ed.) § 11.
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close and obvious. The similarity to shipper-carrier-insurer
cases, and to assured-indemnity insurer and tort-feasor cases
is quite apparent.'3 It is true enough that equities of the re-
cited parties could not be entirely adjusted in courts of law
under all circumstances or perhaps at law at all at first. But
under enlightened rules of procedure and by virtue of the
growth of codes of practice these earlier obstacles to the en-
forcement of subrogation rights have been nearly eliminated.
However, even today in a majority of jurisdictions if the
cause of action to which the subrogee claims to be subro-
gated is an equitable one, he must sue in equity and may sue
in his own name. Conversely, however, if the claim on which
the subrogation is founded is cognizable at law, the action of
subrogation should be sustained at law. While originally the
subrogee would sue "for use of" etc., the "real party in in-
terest," statutes may require that the action be brought in
the name of the subrogee, and local statutes may require
further disclosures of the transaction by recitals or affida-
vits. 4 A modern view of subrogation circumspectly and ju-
dicially applied to the cases should bring about just and
equitable decisions for all parties, unless hampered by ex-
press statutory limitation or by narrowly sticking to the let-
ter in the interpretation.
In a review of decided cases, the factors most operative
While the older cases held that the subrogee must have actually paid, the newer
cases, especially those resting upon statutory sanction and applied to compen-
sation cases, generally hold that subrogation occurs even before payment, if it
has been "fixed" or determined. Friebel v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 280 Ill. 76, 117
N.E. 467 (1917). And it has been so held even before an award, where the employ-
er's liability was created by the act, and the statute authorized the potential
indemnitor's action against the third party tort feasor. Moreno v. Los Angeles
Transfer Co., 44 Cal. App. 551, 186 P. 800 (1920). And in Sanders v. National Biscuit
Co., 172 N.Y.S. 917 (1918), it was held that the election of the employee to take
compensation Ipso facto assigned his claim and created actionable subrogation.
13 Various writers have seen an analogy in compensation cases to cases in-
volving life and accident insurance, and as there is admittedly no indemnity avail-
able to the paying insurer in such cases, these writers have been unable to believe
subrogation truly applicable to compensation cases in the absence of statute.
For this view see 38 Harv. L. Rev. 971 at 972, and to the contrary Vance, Insur-
ance (2d ed.) p. 680 and notes; T. P. Hardman, "The Common-Law Right of
Subrogation Under Workmen's Compensation Acts," 26 W. Va. L. Rev. 183 at 184
et seq.
14 It has been stated that the doctrine of subrogation has progressed in much
the same way as the doctrine of assignment, and that it has encountered and
overcome procedural difficulties in much the same manner. See Offer v. Superior
Court, 194 Cal. 114, 228 P. 11 (1924).
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in preventing legal subrogation to which the courts apparent-
ly gave the greatest weight seem to have been, in the main,
statutes, procedure, timing, public policy.
If compensation acts are viewed in the light of their
avowed purpose and if the peculiarly appropriate situations
for the application of subrogation principles where a third-
party tort-feasor is involved are borne in mind, subrogation
should be allowed even in the absence of express legislation,
unless the subrogation were applied in such a manner as to
defeat the main purpose of the act. The accurate definition of
subrogation as a principle of equity should forestall this re-
sult. The idea of legal subrogation not based on contract nor
on statute has not been well received, although as early as
1911 an early federal decision explored the idea thoroughly
and reached a desirable affirmative result.15
The time has gone by for a discussion of the possibility of
subrogation in the absence of statutes, since almost all states
have enacted, amended, and re-enacted statutes, rather ex-
plicitly defining and limiting the circumstances and the extent
of subrogation. A workable application of legal subrogation
without statutory sanction was concisely presented by Pro-
fessor Thomas P. Hardman in the West Virginia Law Quar-
terly in 1920.18 Since that article appeared, the legislatures
have put in twenty years of alterations on the acts and no
state has been content to let legal subrogation be applied
solely by the judiciary.
If at the inception of workmen's compensation acts, the
states had uniformly made the employer immediately and
directly liable for payments for both injuries and deaths
under the acts and had followed this by the allowance of joint
actions commenced by either employer or employee or the
latter's representatives against wrongdoing third persons,
with equitable adjustment of the proceeds of such actions
under court control and approval, little would be left to dif-
fer about other than the liability of "fellow employees," and
"fellow employers" who were also under the act. Even as to
these, the act could have announced the public policy which
15 Travelers Insurance Co. v. Great Lakes Engineering Works Co. 184 F. 426,
36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 60 (1911).
Is T. P. Hardman, "The Common-Law Right of Subrogation under Workmen's
Compensation Acts," 26 W. Va. L. Quart. 183 (1920).
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would be based upon the desirability of permitting law ac-
tions against them for damages, or confining the actions to
indemnity, or denying a remedy at all in the case of the
"fellow employee." Settlements out of court with third par-
ties should be by agreement only with court or commission
approval."
Unfortunately, no uniformity occurred, and by 1924, when
compensation acts had been passed by forty-two states, the
statutes of Arizona, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Utah,
and West Virginia of these forty-two contained no provision
as to the rights of employer and employee against third-
party wrongdoers. 18 As to the thirty-six states providing for
such rights and expressly stating the liability of the third
person, these differed in that in Massachusetts the employee
was faced with an election to proceed against his employer
or the third person; in Rhode Island, the employee could pro-
ceed against both but recover from only one; in California,
he could proceed against both and recover from both, but if
he recovered from the third person, he would then need to
indemnify the employer who had paid.
In each of the thirty-six states of which the three just
mentioned are given as samples of groupings, the employer
who had paid compensation was subrogated to the rights of
the employee against the third person (Wyoming excepted)."9
If the action of subrogation were instituted by the employer
in ten of the thirty-six states, he could recover only the
compensation paid or payable; in nineteen, he could recover
the employee's full damages, but was required to pay the
excess over to the employee; and in the remaining six states,
the awarding of compensation was said to be an assignment
of the employee's cause of action to the person or carrier
who had paid the compensation. This left open a possibility
that under the assigned cause of action, the employer or
carrier who had paid compensation, only, might recover
more than his payments. Happily this result was reached
17 California has at present substantially these rather perfect provisions. See
California Code of 1937, Workmen's Compensation Act, and amendments to
include 1939.
18 Summary taken from 38 Harv. L. Rev. 971, citing from Hill & Wilkin, Work-
men's Compensation Statute Law.
19 Ibid.
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only in New York, and the law was subsequently amended.2"
Equally as illogical is to permit double recovery by an em-
ployee through acceptance of compensation, and damages by
suit, yet it has occurred under authority of the statute.
It is to be held in mind that uniformity is not the zenith of
consideration, and that even the equitable principles of sub-
rogation 2' must properly fit into the spirit and purpose of
workmen's compensation acts. However, there seems to be
no good reason for not attempting a uniform and predictable
result in the consideration of third party liability, particular-
ly where the third person is a stranger to the act. And a plain
statement of the liability of a fellow employee would an-
nounce the public policy of the state, while a division of third-
party employers into "within" and "without" the act would
enable their liability to be measured in terms of compensa-
tion or of damage, in which public policy would again be
largely controlling.
STATUTORY CHANGES
The trend of statutes generally has been toward a sharp-
er delineation of the rights of all parties concerned, but leav-
ing ample room for judicial construction, and unfortunately,
still ample room for procedural problems.
In Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,22 Oregon, Washington,
and Wyoming, as of January, 1940, all compensation is pay-
able from a state fund only, except that in Ohio the employer,
under state approval, may carry his own risks uninsured.
Where the state has a monopoly of compensation insurance
as in these states, the private carrier will not figure in litiga-
tion of local creation. In these states the employee has the
option, forced at times,23 to elect compensation or sue the
20 Travelers Insurance Co. v. Brass Goods Mfg. Co., 239 N.Y. 273, 146 N.E. 377
(1925), discussed in 38 Harv. L. Rev. 971.
21 Klotz v. Newark Paving Co., 86 N.J. Law 690, 92 A. 1086 (1914).
22 In West Virginia, employers may carry their own risks but they must con-
tribute to the expense of administering the state fund. Although Ohio forbids insur-
ing of workmen's compensation liability in order to create a monopoly in the state,
yet a suit could be maintained in Ohio courts against an Ohio corporation by a
foreign insurer subrogee as provided for under Alabama law where the cause of
action arose and compensation became payable. American Mutual Liability Ins.
Co. v. U.S. Electrical Tool Co., 55 Ohio App. 107, 9 N.E. (2d) 157 (1936).
23 In Oregon, the employee has an option to accept compensation, or to sue
the third person. If he accepts compensation, his right of action is assigned to
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third party. If he elects compensation, the state fund or com-
mission will be subrogated to his action, or, as in Oregon and
Washington, his cause of action will be assigned to the state
fund. Should the fund or commission recover, the excess
goes to the employee. If the employee sues, his compensation
will be properly diminished by the recovery. The employer
does not figure in the litigation.
In West Virginia, although a state fund is established,
the employer under certain conditions may carry his own
risk, and he is not prohibited from insuring with a private
carrier. The compensation statute, however, deals solely
with employer and employee and makes no reference to
third parties. It simply creates a fund to which the employee
may apply for compensation and "partakes of the nature of
pension." There is nothing in the statute which would prohibit
an employee who has received damages from a third party
from receiving compensation for damages arising from the
same act.24 The possibility of double recovery was recog-
nized but disregarded. No cases in West Virginia seem
to have dealt with this problem directly presented.
The year 1940 finds New Hampshire unchanged. Com-
pensation is at the option of the employee. There is no pro-
vision for subrogation of any kind, and the employee may
disregard the compensation act and sue his employer at
law, or he may make application for compensation under
the act. The employee may sue the third party and collect
damages and in addition may claim compensation from his
employer.2 5 In view of these possibilities, it seems peculiar-
ly inconsistent to hold that a release (or receipt) for com-
pensation should bar the employee's claim for damages
against a third party, but it was so held in Mullins v. Mer-
chant's National Bank.26
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Michi-
the state; if he sues, the state fund is liable for a deficiency. If within twenty days
after notice from the Commission the employee fails to file written election to sue,
he is deemed to have elected compensation. Oregon Code 1930, sec. 49-1814, 1814a,
and amendments of 1933, construed in King v. Union Oil Co. of California, 144 Ore.
655, 24 P. (2d) 345 (1933); Walter v. Turtle, 146 Ore. 1, 29 P. (2d) 517 (1934).
24 Mercer v. Ott, 78 W. Va. 629, 89 S.E. 952 (1916).
25 Holland v. Morley Button Co., 83 N.H. 482, 145 A. 142 (1929).
26 88 N.H. 90, 184 A. 565 (1936).
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gan, Montana, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, 7
and Utah have state funds, but private carriers are permit-
ted. Their statutes provide for subrogation or "assignment"
usually to the state fund, or the employer, or insurance com-
pany, or person who shall have paid or become liable to pay
the compensation.
Of the remaining states, where only private insurance
exists, the statutes of nineteen make no specific mention of the
private insurance carrier as subrogee or assignee. In six
states this is because of the state monopoly of insurance, in
which the statute may provide for assignment of the cause
of action to the fund. In thirteen states,28 the statute is simply
silent.
The unique positions of New Hampshire and West Vir-
ginia have already been referred to. Mississippi has as yet no
compensation act and Arkansas will submit an act on refer-
endum to the people sometime in 1940.
Thus it may surely be said that twenty odd years of
statute making and mending have not produced uniformity
even in those states where compensation has become a state
monopoly, nor on the other hand where compensation insur-
ance has been left entirely to private enterprise. In fact, the
contrary might well be urged since the statutes as amended
have more sharply delineated rights and remedies, and the
courts have carefully made distinctions that with a more
liberal interpretation could have been eliminated in the inter-
est of equitable principles.
PROCEDURE
It will be realized at the outset that procedural prob-
lems are often bound up closely with substantive principles,
and although a case may be susceptible of fine analysis and
the two-fold aspects carefully divided, yet for practical dis-
cussion the division need not be made. The distinction usually
maintained between subrogation in case of wrongful death
and subrogation upon a claim for injuries only is of frequent
27 In Texas an employer's mutual insurance association has been specially
created by the workmen's compensation law, and the effect is to produce a fair
substitute for state funds. Kentucky has a similar mutual association sanctioned
by the compensation act.
28 Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Louisiana. Minnesota, Missouri, West Virginia, New Hampshire.
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occurrence. The absence of a right of action for wrongful
death at common law, and the creation of such a right by
statute specifically naming the parties who may bring the
action and who shall be the beneficiaries is well known. There
are decisions intimating that for wrongful death of an em-
ployee at the hands of a third party there can properly be
no subrogation to the employer nor to the insurance com-
pany. 9 There are decisions that compensation acts make
this possible both by direct language and by legislative intent
judicially discerned.3 ° In arriving at either result, the courts
have usually considered the problem as one of substantive
right compounded with procedure. If procedure were no ob-
stacle, there should be no valid objection to applying princi-
ples of subrogation to death cases for the employer or insur-
ance company's suit is, in a certain sense, not for the wrong-
ful death as a statutory addition to common law but for the
29 In an action at law for subrogation of the insurance carrier who had paid a
death claim, the court held that under New York law, an action for wrongful
death is maintainable only by the personal representatives, and any recovery is
for the benefit of all the next of kin. The result is that suit in the name of the
insurance carrier is only available to such cases when the class of persons to
whom the carrier has paid compensation include all the next of kin. Subrogation
is to the cause of action-not the right of action of the employee injured by a
third party. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Incinerator Co., 51 F.
(2d) 739 (D. C., S.D. N.Y., 1931). This disposed of count one of the insurance
carrier's declaration, for the court would not allow the insurance company to
split the cause of action for its benefit. The second count alleged the liability
of the third party in a breach of contract with the employer (failure properly to
supervise the building of a safe furnace arch for the employer, by reason of
which failure the arch fell and precipitated the employee to his death). This count
showed no privity between the insurer and the third party, but the plaintiff was
given leave to amend if it should turn out that in the compensation policy some
provision might be found giving the insurer an assignment of the rights the em-
ployer might have had in his contract with the third party furnace builder. In
Oklahoma there is subrogation to the employer or insurance company but not for
fatal injuries. O.S. 1931, § 13348 et seq. as amended, 85 O.S. Ann., § 1 et seq.
50 In Storrs v. Mech, 166 Md. 124, 170 A. 743 (1934), an employer who had paid
compensation to a deceased employee's dependent sister and then sought to be
reimbursed by maintaining an action against the tort-feasor was faced with the
argument that the Death Statute provided that recovery should be for the benefit
of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the deceased and did not include a
sister. The court held the Compensation Act did not create a new liability, but
did enlarge the class of persons who might take advantage of the liability created
by the Death Statute and in construing both acts together held the employee's
sister could be included and that since the sister could have sued the third person
the employer could maintain the suit for indemnity. Coleman v. Cating Rope
Works, 286 N.Y.S. 315 (1936); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Moses, 287 U.S. 530,
53 S. Ct. 77 231, 77 L. Ed. 477, 88 A.L.R. 647 (1933); Stiglitz Furnace Co. v. Stith's
Admr., 234 Ky. 12, 27 S.W. (2d) 402 (1930); Brown v. Southern Ry. Co., 202 N.C.
256, 162 S.E. 613 (1932).
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tortious act of the third party which caused the employer or
carrier to pay compensation under the act under circum-
stances that would have entitled the employee or his repre-
sentative to an action against the third person. If substantive
law were no obstacle, surely enlightened principles of pro-
cedure would not be at a loss to provide a vehicle for the em-
ployer's suit against the third party.
At the risk of prolixity, the following three situations are
presented under the heading of substance and procedure.
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
In Illinois, where a farmer (expressly exempted from ap-
plication of the act) was alleged to have wrongfully caused
the death of an employee under the act, an appellate court
dismissed a suit by the employer (who had paid compensa-
tion to the widow) claiming indemnity from the farmer, on
the ground that the farmer was not a third party." Scrutin-
izing the act closely and interpreting it strictly, the court ad-
vanced the argument that a death action survives only by
statute, towit, the Injuries Act or the Compensation Act. The
Injuries Act would have permitted the widow as personal
representative of the deceased employee to sue the farmer.
The Illinois Compensation Act added only the two possibili-
ties specifically mentioned in the act-third parties under the
act and those third parties who might otherwise be under the
act but who had elected not to be bound by it. As the farmer
was expressly exempted from the application of the act, the
act itself was not broad enough to give the employer the right
to sue the farmer.32 It is difficult to think of this case as it
31 Agar Packing & Provision Co. v. Becker, 301 IMI. App. 237, 22 N.E. (2d) 447
(1939).
32 The court construed par. 5 of Section 29 of the Illinois Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, which provides: "In the event the said employee or his personal repre-
sentative shall fail to institute a proceeding against such third person at any
time prior to three months before said action would be barred at law said employer
may in his own name, or in the name of the employee, or his personal representa-
tive, commence a proceeding against such other person for the recovery of dam-
ages on account of such injury or death to the employee, and out of any amount
recovered the employer shall pay over to the injured employee or his personal
representative all sums collected from such other person by judgment or other-
wise in excess of the amount of such compensation paid or to be paid under this
Act, and costs, attorney's fees and reasonable expenses as may be incurred by
such employer in making such collection or in enforcing such liability." Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1939, Ch. 48. § 166.
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was disposed of other than as a mixture of substance and
procedure and the decision has been criticized.3 It surely is
highly unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended
to save a class of wrongdoers who are in no wise related to
the compensation scheme, and the contrary intention should
be presumed whether the action against the wrongdoer is by
an administrator or personal representative under a wrong-
ful death statute or whether it is by an employer who has paid
compensation and thereby become subrogated under the
compensation act. 4
In Texas, the statute provides that the employee may
elect to take compensation or to sue the third person. If he ac-
cepts compensation, he thereby assigns his right of action to
the state, association, or other insurer, and he may not there-
after sue at law. He is not entitled to compensation if he
elects to proceed against the third party at law.3 5 But it has
been held that an injured employee or his personal repre-
sentative may sue a third party even after accepting com-
pensation if the insurer refuses to sue. The recovery, how-
ever, is limited to the excess of damages over compensation
if the insurer is not a party to the suit. If the insurer would
join, then complete damages could be recovered, from which
sum the insurer or party paying compensation would be
indemnified. The reason assigned is that the employee is the
real beneficiary in cases where damages exceed the amount
of compensation. Under equitable principles, the real bene-
ficiary may sue for protection and enforcement of his rights
where the person having the mere legal title through assign-
ment by statutory operation fails or refuses to do so. 6 This
seems to be a wholesome result, and justice to the employee,
the employer, and the insurer is the objective despite the
statutory statements of inability of the employee to sue after
having accepted compensation. It has also been held in Texas
that the insurer who has paid compensation may request the
employee to bring an action for the insurer's benefit as well
as his own. 7 It is impossible to say that procedure was here
33 Note, 18 CaicAco-yKEN' LAW REVIEW 117.
34 Botthof v. Fenske, 280 Ill. App. 362 (1935), and cases cited therein.
35 Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Brandon, 126 Tex. 636, 89 S.W. (2d) 982 (1936).
86 Schnick v. Morris, 24 S.W. (2d) 491 (Tex. Civ. App., 1929).
37 Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Mallott, 6 S.W. (2d) 432 (Tex. Civ. App., 1928).
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minimized, and equitable results achieved through recogni-
tion of the principles of subrogation without the necessity of
specific wording in the statute, since the cases prior to the
1925 amendment of the Texas statute held there was no
subrogation either expressly or by implication.
In Minnesota, 3 where an employee was injured and
compensation under the act was promptly assumed by the
employer in an amount of over $5,000, and where physicians
were furnished by the employer, the employee later com-
menced an action for malpractice against the physicians
and settled the case for around $1,200. The employer then
gave notice of discontinuance of compensation, and peti-
tioned the Industrial Commission to be allowed credit for the
sum recovered by the employee from the physicians, and in
the alternative to have the commission find that the employer
and insurer were not responsible for the disability resulting
from malpractice. This petition was demurred to as failing
to state facts sufficient to warrant the granting of any relief
thereunder. The commission sustained the demurrer, al-
though as a matter of procedure, it was an anomaly in the
practice. The Minnesota Supreme Court commendably
brushed aside the anomalous character of the pleading and
disposed of the question on its merits, stating that under the
great weight of authority, the legitimate consequences of the
accident, including unskillfulness of physicians furnished,
constitute a proper claim for compensation, and are the basis
for determining the extent and amount of the employee's
claim. But-the employer was not permitted to take credit
for the settlement nor could the employer be subrogated to
the employee's claim for "damages" against the physicians,
since the physicians' tort was independent, subsequent, and
supplemental to the original injury.
... how can it be said that a physician's malpractice has anything to
do with the original injury ("happening suddenly and violently . . . and
producing at the time injury to" the employee's body) in so far as his
liability is concerned to the injured workman whom he treats? . . .How
can we say that the injured man's accidental hurt was here caused "under
88 See note, 16 Tex. L. Rev. 437. For a complete treatise in textbook form of
the Texas Compensation Law, see Lawler, Texas Workmen's Compensation Law
(1938), Ch. XVII, and for summary of present subrogation see page 589, § 411.
39 McGough v. McCarthy Improvement Co., 206 Minn. 1, 287 N.W. 857 (1939).
SUBROGATION UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
circumstances also creating a legal liability for damages" by the mal-
practicing physician?
The opinion then states the inference that statutory sub-
rogation to the employer cannot be based upon a physician's
torts, although the physician's torts give rise to compensa-
tion, and this was the holding upon petition for reargument.41
In this Minnesota case Justice Stone dissented, stating
that the essential premise of the majority decision was that
the employer was liable upon the one claim of the employee
for compensation, which included damages flowing from the
malpractice of the physicians. He further said, "If that is
right, and I think it is, how can we say, in view of the explicit
provision of subdivision 2, affirmatively granting the employ-
er the right to subrogation, that he shall notwithstanding be
denied the right?"'" Justice Stone concluded his dissent with
language particularly appropriate to one of the contentions
of this paper.
One word more. We are all so fond of the protection afforded by the com-
pensation law to employes that it is easy to ignore both extent and detail
of the reciprocal protection afforded employers. In proportion as this
decision denies an employer the right of subrogation against a third party
we are depriving him of an affirmative protection expressly granted by
the statute. And we are by judicial grant giving the employe a double
award which, except as to the excess of the tort recovery over the amount
of compensation, the statute denies.
In the foregoing cases, cited at some length, the endeavor
has been to show that subrogation was allowed or not allowed
upon a consideration of public policy, an interpretation of
the statute, judicial refinement of definitions, or upon a blend
of substance and procedure, which a fair consideration of the
40 Fully twenty years previously the Supreme Court of Minnesota had held that
an employer was not liable for the results of any malpractice on the part of a
physician he employs to treat his employee (using due care in the selection) and
by reason thereof the employer was not subrogated to any claim of the employee
for malpractice. Viita v. Dolan, 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077, L.R.A. 1916D 644
(1916). This seems perfectly logical, and if now the employer shall be held for
compensation which includes malpractice of his physician, but shall still be denied
subrogation against the physician, then the statute should so state, or a public
policy basis should be announced judicially.
41 To the same effect, and cited by Stone in his dissent, see Overbook v. Nex,
261 Mich. 156 at 161, 246 N.W. 196 at 198 (1939). "No reason why a distinction should
be made between the undisputed rights of the employer to subrogate himself to
the employee's rights against third parties responsible for the original injury
and the right to subrogate himself when compensation has been paid for an aggra-
VAtion caused by the malpractice of a third party." Same holding, Baker v,
Wycoff, 95 Utah 199, 79 P. (2d) 77 (1938),
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principles of subrogation would have eliminated, and where
subrogation fairly applied could have produced a harmony
and uniformity of result. If the facts of these three cases had
been before the courts of the other forty-three jurisdictions,
we might have had forty-three disparate results.
TIMING
Many proper cases of subrogation have been defeated
by the bar of the statute of limitations. The injury or death
occurs, the compensation is paid, or is awarded, and by the
time the employer or insurer is in a position to know the full
measure of his liability and the responsibility of some third
party, the statute has run and the chance for recoupment is
gone. No doubt lack of diligence might account for some of
these failures, but certain situations contain inherently the
impossibility of indemnity by court action.
It is generally accepted that the compensation act subro-
gates the employer or insurer to the cause of action of the
employee.. Consequently the statute begins to run against the
action for subrogation, as of the time it commenced to run
against the employee.42 That this may work hardship on the
subrogee is recognized by the courts, and the judges have in-
timated that correction, if proper, should originate with the
legislatures. It was stated in a New York case that the
court should not read into the statute an intention to create a
new cause of action, even though no award is made until after
the statute has run against the cause of action of the em-
ployee. This latter statement indicates the possibility of los-
ing the right before the right has been established. If the
42 Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Chicago Rys. Co., 307 Ill. 322, 138 N.E. 658
(1923). The Illinois Supreme Court disregarded a contrary holding in the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals (Star Brewing Co. v. Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co.)
275 F. 330 (1921), lying in the same district, in which the federal court, in inter-
preting the Illinois act, said that the scheme of the act contemplated the abolition
of the employee's right against a third person under the act where compensation
had been paid, and there was nothing to subrogate to. The act itself "created" the
employer's cause of action (subrogation) and the five-year statute of limitations
(otherwise two years) applied. Since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58
S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938), the federal court would now
probably follow the state court interpretation of the act. For an A.L.R. annotation
on a case holding with the majority view, see J. F. Elkins Construction Co. v.
Naill Bros., 168 Tenn. 165, 76 S.W. (2d) 326, 95 A.L.R. 1429, 1431 (1934). See also
Goldschmidt v. Pevely Dairy Co., 341 Mo. 982, 111 S.W. (2d) 1 (1937).
43 Exchange Mutual Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co.,
243 N.Y. 75, 152 N.E. 470 (1926).
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employer could estimate the responsibility of the third party
and the chances of successful suit while still engaged in de-
termining, by hearings before the commission, the character
and extent of his liability under the act, and if he could then
commence suit against the wrongdoer, he would never be too
late.
There is a contrary view in Texas, where it has been held
that inasmuch as the insurer's right of subrogation is en-
forceable only under the statute, which requires a final judg-
ment against the employer or insurer, the cause of action to
the employer or insurer does not accrue until the entry of
final judgment. The statute of limitations applicable to the
employee's right of action is therefore tolled until the entry of
final judgment against the employer or insurer. 44
In Louisiana, it has been held that an employer who had
paid compensation could bring suit for indemnification as
upon an implied or quasi-contract, and that he should be re-
imbursed for money paid on account of the fault of a third
party; and further, that the statute did not begin to run
against such cause of action until the payment had been
made, although if the employer had brought an action for
subrogation under the workmen's compensation act, the
statute would have run as of the time of the injury to the
employee. 45
It has been quite generally held that the suit for subro-
gation will not lie until some significant act in the nature of
assumption of the liability for compensation has taken place,
but after the liability has been "fixed," "determined, 1 46
"agreed to,"' 7 or an "award" made48 although not yet ac-
tually paid,'49 or perhaps to be paid only in installments
44 Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Texas Power & Light Co., 35 S.W. (2d) 782
(Tex. Civ. App., 1931).
45 Foster & Glassell Co. v. Knight Bros., 152 La. 596, 93 So. 913 (1922). See also
Tuckwood v. Mayor, Rotherham, etc., [1921) 1 K.B. 526. The idea of the Louisiana
case would be quite in line with the progenitor cases of subrogation involving
debtor, creditor, and surety as in Junker v. Rush, 136 11. 179, 26 N.E. 499 (1891).
4e Bauer v. Rusetos & Co., 306 Ill. 602, 138 N.E. 206 (1923).
47 The employer or insurer may require a written assignment from the employee
or his dependents before paying any compensation. Revised Statutes of Utah 1933,
* 42-1-58.
48 Alford v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 202 N.C. 719, 164 S.E. 125 (1932). The
court held that a formal award in writing filed under the statute was a prerequisite
to the accrual of the right of the insurer.
49 Payment of the compensation due an employee or his dependents is not a
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which will run beyond the period of the statute of limitations
applicable, the subrogation suit may be enforced against the
wrongdoer, and the future payments computed by proper
evidence. 50 Such a result, however, cannot be promised in
the jurisdictions where there are no decided cases, although
such a result seems fair. Actual payment should not be a
condition precedent to the bringing of an action for subroga-
tion.51 An early case, involving workmen's compensation in
Indiana, 52 wherein the insurer based the right of subrogation
upon the policy contract with the employer, held that the
right of subrogation would be conferred on the insurer only
in the event that it had paid the whole liability due. A later
case sustained the holding but distinguished conventional sub-
rogation from statutory provision, and in the latter instance
stated that statutory right arose upon determination of the
liability and payment was not a prerequisite.58
To return briefly to one of the underlying causes of the
possibility that the Statute of Limitations will run against
the subrogee's action, it may be stated that in thirty or more
of the states the employee is given an option or an election to
claim compensation or to bring a suit for damages against
the third party. In forcing an election upon the employee, the
first consideration has not been the fear that the one who
paid compensation shall fail of reimbursement because of the
running of the statute. Nor should this be the first considera-
tion. What is best socially is of more importance than what
is most beneficial for a commercial risk-bearer. 54 Just what is
condition precedent to the employer's exercise of his right of subrogation since
the statute provides that recovery by the employer shall not be limited to the
amount payable as compensation, but he may recover any amount which the
employee would have been entitled to recover. But the excess shall go to the
employee. The case distinguishes previous cases under which an apparent mis-
apprehension arose as to payment being a condition precedent to subrogation.
State v. Haid et al., 332 Mo. 616, 59 S.W. (2d) 690 at 692 (1933).
50 Bauer v. Rusetos & Co. 306 Ill. 602, 138 N.E. 206 (1923). Subrogee can recover
the entire amount to the extent of "aggregate" compensation payable and not yet
paid, and although the amount will be dependent upon the continued existence
of the employee.
51 Merino v. Pacific Coast Borax Co., 124 Cal. App. 336, 12 P. (2d) 458 (1932).
52 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cincinnati, C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 74 Ind. App. 272,
124 N.E. 774 (1919).
53 Wabash Water & Light Co. v. Home Telephone Co., 79 Ind. App. 395, 138 N.E.
692 (1923).
54 See Dodd, Administration of Workmen's Compensation, pp. 611-616.
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the latitude to be given the employee will hardly be divulged
from a reading of the statutes. In a majority of the states no
time is fixed within which the option or choice must be exer-
cised, but in the jurisdictions where the statutes have fixed
limits the time limits vary from as little as twenty days in
Oregon55 to as much as one year (in case of injury) and
eighteen months (in case of death) in Kansas.56 In between
these limits an assignment may take place by electing to
take compensation, or by failing to make an election "in
writing; ' 57 or by accepting compensation, then demanding
that the employer bring suit, and upon his failure so to do,
within six months after the injury, revesting the right of ac-
tion in the employee.58 The lack of uniformity is most ob-
vious, and even similarity is hard to perceive.
PUBLIC POLICY
It will probably be admitted that every aspect of work-
men's compensation legislation reflects a public policy. The
fundamental scope and purpose were expressions of public
policy toward an intolerable social situation. It is therefore
little to be wondered at that the various parts of the compen-
sation acts bear the imprint of public policy, first as an-
nounced by the legislature and secondly as perceived by the
courts in the interpretation of legislative intent. The final
opinion of the supreme court has often reached a conclusion
at variance with the initial intent. The challenge of earlier
ideas and the rules of procedure have produced some unan-
ticipated results. That there should be some variation in the
public policies of the several states was to be expected, but
that an announcement of what is good for an employee, an
employer, or an insurer should be met by a flat contradiction
in another jurisdiction causes one to consider more closely
and to wonder if both could be right since two public policies
could be correct and still be contradictory. Probably the
most outstanding contradiction is the legislative or judicial
55 If within twenty days the employee fails to elect, he is deemed to have elected
compensation. Oregon Code, 1933. Comp. Act. §§ 49-1814, 49-1814a.
56 General Statutes of Kansas, 1935, and amendments of 1939, § 44-504.
57 Colorado requires the employee to elect In writing whether to take compen-
sation or sue the third person.
58 North Carolina, § 11. Rogers et al., v. Southeastern Construction Co., 214
N.C. 269, 199 S.E. 41 (1938).
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attitude toward suits by employees against "fellow employ-
ees," and the possible sequel that the employer should there-
by have subrogation against his own servant.
It has been frequently said that there is no good reason
to hold that a fellow servant should not be liable for negligent
or wilful acts toward anyone, for it would remove the re-
straint of personal responsibility,59 and that compensation
acts ought not to exempt employees negligently injuring co-
employees from liability,6 for such exemption would be ob-
viously against public policy. This seems sound reasoning,
and to hold contrariwise would be to set up the dangerous
precedent that a man should be not accountable for his
wrongful acts.61 Probably a majority of states would so
hold, where the action is for damages in a suit brought di-
rectly by the injured employee against his fellow, unless the
statute expressly anticipates and forbids the action by such
words of exclusion as "not in the same employ" (Utah), or
"extra hazardous employment" (Washington).62 It is be-
lieved by some, however, that the common-law right should
be denied on social grounds, in that the hope of recovery of a
larger sum in damages from a co-employee than the com-
pensation available is a false hope, with slight prospect of
fulfillment in fact, with potential danger of losing the secur-
ity of compensation, and creating dissension among em-
ployees63
Where the employee is permitted to sue and recover from
the fellow employee, and thereafter indemnify his employer,
or where the employer pays for the injury and is thereby sub-
rogated to the employee's common-law cause of action
against his own employee, this rather logical sequel is not
believed to be in the best interests of the compensation
scheme, for in effect it will not be casting the burden upon
59 Judson v. Fielding, 237 N.Y.S. 348 (1929).
60 Hall v. Hill, 285 N.Y.S. 815 (1936). In City of New York v. Fusco et al.,
9 N.Y.S. (2d) 911 (1939), the contrary is suggested, but the case is decided on
another point.
61 This is the argument in decision in Lees & Sykes v. Dunkerly Bros., 103 L.T.
(N.S.) 467, 55 Sol. Jo. 44, 5 B.W.W.C. 276 (1910), an early and persuasive case, in
which the employer was subrogated to an action for indemnity from his own
employees.
62 Pryor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 196 Wash. 389, 83 P. (2d) 241 (1938).
63 As to the merits or real advantages of third party liability actions generally
see Dodd, Administration of Workmen's Compensation, pp. 605 et seq.
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industry but will be relieving the industry at the expense of
one of the proposed beneficiaries, even though he may have
been the original cause of the injury under the common-law
view.64 Common law and logic should give way to social
justice under a public policy announced in the statutes. If the
statutes fail to make this clear, it is a fair and proper task of
interpretation for the courts in declaring policy.
CONCLUSION
Thirty years of experience in the operation and effect of
compensation acts would appear sufficient to have given rise
to certain fundamental situations in almost every state, and
these fundamental situations would be of such recurrence
that ample opportunity to revise, modify, and supplement the
law applicable would tend to produce a certain uniformity in
the forty-six states. The lack of uniformity in the organiza-
tion and administration of the acts is explainable in that the
sphere, importance, and permanence of administrative
bodies was as yet not well recognized in the United States.
Differences in the schedule of benefits available would be de-
termined somewhat by the economic standing and the de-
gree of industrialization of the particular state. But it seems
most curious that such varied results could be obtained in
the application of such old and acknowledged legal principles
as those of indemnity and subrogation to such peculiarly ap-
propriate relations as those created by the compensation
acts. The value of uniform laws operating uniformly through-
out the forty-eight states is well recognized but uniformity in
the compensation acts will not be achieved until there is uni-
formity in the belief of the social objectives of such legisla-
tion, and the belief must be similarly shared by the legisla-
tures and the judiciary, with a willingness to simplify pro-
cedure to attain the desired end.
64 An excellent summary will be found in note, 15 Corn. L. Q. 148.
